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FOREWORD
Over the past few years, a vigorous debate about
the wisdom and mechanics of nuclear disarmament
has emerged around the world, particularly in the
United States. Washington’s current wave of support
for disarmament was ignited unexpectedly in 2007 by
a bipartisan group of national security experts. Calls
for the elimination of nuclear weapons have existed
for almost as long as the weapons themselves. But
these developments, coupled with President Barack
Obama’s clear support for disarmament and the successful ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, have left American supporters of abolition
feeling as if the scales may finally be weighted in favor
of their goal—even though they acknowledge that it
will not be easily achieved.
In his monograph, Jonathan Pearl challenges the
notion that the probability of nuclear disarmament is
increasing. He argues that, contrary to popular belief,
there is little new about the current push for disarmament, buttressing his claim with a historical overview
of the nuclear age that highlights important similarities between past and present disarmament efforts.
Building on this historical analysis, Pearl surveys the
current political-strategic context, one that is marked
by continuing proliferation, various forms of conflict,
and significant conceptual and structural barriers to
abolishing nuclear weapons. It is far from certain,
Pearl provocatively concludes, whether Washington’s
current pro-disarmament efforts will produce meaningful or lasting results.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as an important contribution to the
debate over nuclear disarmament. Whether readers
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are disarmament supporters or skeptics, Pearl’s contribution will serve as an important reference point for
debates on this critical subject.
		

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
When four luminaries of U.S. policymaking—Cold
Warriors, all—penned a 2007 op-ed calling for global
nuclear disarmament, a shock wave emanated through
the policy community in Washington and abroad.1
Had age or the stress of public life finally taken its
toll on these elder statesmen? How could the goal of
disarmament be practically achieved? Was their plea,
in fact, a cynical ploy to strengthen a conventionally
dominant United States? Were not communist sympathizers, naïve world government types, or a periodically randy anti-nuclear movement the only ones who
took disarmament seriously? Perhaps most important,
did their statement reflect a convergence of sentiment
in the United States in favor of abolition? Might the
United States abolish nuclear weapons in our lifetime?
President Barack Obama’s open support for nuclear abolition and his efforts to decrease the number
and role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security
policy have led many to believe that the United States
will one day shed its nuclear arsenal. Yet the future of
U.S. nuclear weapons policy is uncertain. Contrary to
popular belief, the general approach being advanced
today by the Obama administration is strikingly similar to mainstream proposals of the past 65 years: arms
control and nonproliferation now, disarmament at an
undetermined point in the future. Meanwhile, numerous factors continue to militate against abolition, including a growing Pakistani arsenal and new sources
of instability in the Middle East. Indeed, just as the
perceived need for abolition may be growing, so may
the difficulty of achieving it.
This monograph draws upon history and the present context to argue that observers should temper
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their expectations about the prospects for U.S. nuclear
disarmament. The first section traces the rise, decline,
and rebirth of disarmament as a central focus of U.S.
policy, from the immediate postwar period to the fall
of the Soviet Union. The second section examines
the steady decline of support for disarmament in the
post-Cold War era from 1991-2007. The third section
explores the period from 2007 to 2009, during which
disarmament gained significant political traction
among American elites. The fourth section addresses
the Obama administration’s nuclear policy, juxtaposing the President’s lofty goal of disarmament with the
remaining obstacles to its achievement. The fifth section provides conclusions reached by the author.
ENDNOTE - SUMMARY
1. George P. Schultz et al., “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007.
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FORECASTING ZERO:
U.S. NUCLEAR HISTORY AND THE
LOW PROBABILITY OF DISARMAMENT
AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM: NEW TRICK
OR OLD PONY? (1945-91)
Limited Dissent for a Wartime Project.
The first half of the 20th century was replete with
disarmament initiatives, including the Versailles
Treaty, the Five-Power Treaty on Naval Disarmament,
and the World Conference on Disarmament. Indeed,
“[a]lmost every advance in weaponry, from the crossbow to the bomber, has been accompanied by calls for
the weapon’s abolition.”1 In this sense, nuclear weapons have fared similarly to their predecessors.
Anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the United
States extends back at least as far as the days of the
Manhattan Project. Some physicists, including German refugee Max Born, were so disgusted by the
thought of atomic weapons that they refused to work
on the Project at all. Others such as Leo Szilard joined
the wartime effort but hoped that nuclear weapons
would be used only as a deterrent against a potential
Nazi nuclear weapon.
By contrast, key U.S. policymakers warmed early
to the prospect of gaining a decisive military tool.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the initiation
of the Manhattan Project and was allegedly committed to using the bomb once ready, and President Harry S. Truman would eventually order the attacks on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. The Franck Committee’s 1945 report, which warned of the consequences
of nuclear use against Japan, and entreaties against

1

nuclear use by leading scientists during the Roosevelt
and Truman administrations, did little to derail this
pro-nuclear wartime mood in Washington.2
To be sure, there was some disagreement in policy
circles over the need to drop atomic weapons on Japan,
including from then-General Dwight Eisenhower.3 Yet
there was little dissent over whether the United States
should develop and possess them. Secretary of War
Henry Stimson suggested that the bomb constituted a
“royal straight flush” in favor of U.S. power. Secretary
of State James Byrnes concurred that “the bomb might
well put us in a position to dictate our terms at the end
of the war.” By May 1945, 1 month prior to release of
the Franck Commission report, a decision had been
made to use the bomb against Japan.4
Support for the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was widespread in the immediate aftermath of
those attacks. Following the war, more than 86 percent
of Americans polled viewed the attacks as legitimate.5
With the exception of pacifists, some religious figures,
and a few scientists, objections to the use and continued possession of nuclear weapons after the war appear to have been subsumed by a general desire to
ensure a rapid Allied victory, as well as by hopes of
favorably shaping the postwar global order.6
Shaping the Post-War World.
Interestingly, this same desire to shape the postwar world, in combination with a growing realization
that nuclear technology was likely to spread, may have
helped generate the first serious U.S. endorsement of
disarmament. Thus, at the same time that President
Truman was setting the stage for America’s nuclear
arms buildup, he and his administration were also at-
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tempting to establish domestic and international institutions to address the problem of nuclear control.7
Until 1949, the goal of disarmament was front and
center among the Truman administration’s nuclear
policy initiatives. In November 1945, Truman, along
with British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Canadian Prime Minister William King, issued a joint
communiqué explicitly supporting the “elimination
of atomic energy for destructive purposes.”8 Shortly
after the establishment of the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission (UNAEC) on January 24, 1946,
the same Secretary of State James Byrnes, who had expressed support for the bomb during the war and who
was attempting to diplomatically leverage the U.S.
nuclear monopoly to gain advantage over the Soviets,
created a special advisory committee charged with
composing a report on atomic energy control. That
committee’s findings, better known as the AchesonLilienthal report, was to be submitted by the U.S. Government to the UNAEC. Presented to Secretary Byrnes
in March, Acheson-Lilienthal did not set a date for
U.S. nuclear disarmament, but it did express strong
support for this goal.9
Yet Truman feared U.S. disarmament, absent guarantees that the Soviet Union’s bomb-making potential
would be neutered. In the shadow of chilling relations with the Soviets, he appointed Bernard Baruch
as the American delegate to the UNAEC 1 day before
Acheson-Lilienthal was to be submitted to it. Baruch
proceeded to alter key elements of Acheson-Lilienthal
in a way that addressed Truman’s fears. He presented
UNAEC with a plan that would have guaranteed U.S.
disarmament, but only after the effective establishment of international controls. The Soviets rejected the
plan, on the basis that it would have formally legiti-
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mized a temporary U.S. nuclear monopoly. When Baruch’s plan failed during a UNAEC vote on December
30, 1946, the first era of U.S. disarmament efforts came
to a close.10 Indeed, serious efforts toward nuclear
abolition would not return to the international agenda
until late in the Cold War.11
Three Important Shifts Move the United States
Away from Disarmament.
Though the intervening years were not marked by
the complete absence of pro-disarmament sentiment
in the United States, three important developments
undermined the practical hopes of achieving abolition
after the failure of the Baruch plan. First, the political situation changed. By 1949, the Truman Doctrine
had been issued and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been established to contain and
counter the Soviet threat. In the shadow of growing
antagonism and rapidly declining trust between the
United States and the Soviets, the disarmament agenda was increasingly appropriated for propagandistic
purposes, all but guaranteeing that no serious progress could be made toward the goal. Limited American
efforts to advance disarmament by the newly elected
Eisenhower administration were quickly rebuffed by
Soviet leaders, whose intense focus on secrecy led
them to reject the American insistence on conducting
on-site verifications. Moscow instead insisted on complete disarmament without verification.12
Second, the birth of the nuclear arms race in 1949
dramatically altered the security situation. Thus, while
the United States would enjoy a significant nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union for many years to come
and while perceptions of a rapidly growing nuclear

4

threat prompted President Eisenhower to call for the
elimination of “atomic materials for military purposes,” the emergence of a new and formidable enemy
gave impetus to a growing perception in Washington
that a political victory against communism required
military strength, not disarmament.13 Along these
lines, the Eisenhower administration rejected Truman’s distinction between nuclear and conventional
weapons, embarking instead on an ultimately unsuccessful decade-long campaign to legitimize nuclear
weapons as weapons like any other.14 The 1950s also
saw the implementation of Eisenhower’s “New Look”
policy which, driven by economic and military considerations, increased America’s reliance on nuclear
arms. These developments are captured well in Eisenhower’s October 1953 doctrinal guidance that “[i]n
the event of hostilities, the United States will consider
nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other
munitions.”15
The third major change that undermined disarmament efforts was what seems to have been an emerging consensus among U.S. elites that America needed
to refocus its attention on two more proximate and
pressing matters: controlling an emerging arms race
with the Soviets, and containing the global spread of
atomic energy technology.16 The shift toward arms
control was particularly consequential, since there is
a fundamental tension between policies centered on
arms control and those centered on disarmament. By
definition, disarmament changes the nature of the
military balance, whereas most forms of arms control
(e.g., arms reductions, limitations, and test bans) are
directed at stabilizing an existing situation. This may
be in part why Thomas Schelling once quipped that
“. . . hardly anyone who takes arms control seriously
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believes that zero is the goal.”17 At any rate, creating a
stable balance between the United States and the Soviet Union became an overriding concern of American
policymakers throughout the next several decades.
Some hoped that by stabilizing this balance and
regulating nuclear energy transfers, the stage might
be set for a gradual transformation of East-West relations and, eventually, disarmament.18 But this goal
remained consistently out of reach over the coming
decades.
From Kennedy to Carter: The Rise of Arms Control.
U.S. officials continued to offer rhetorical and personal support for disarmament throughout the arms
buildups of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1961, for example,
President John Kennedy argued before the UN General Assembly that:
The weapons of war must be abolished before they
abolish us. . . . Men no longer maintain that disarmament must await the settlement of all disputes—for
disarmament must be a part of any permanent settlement. And men may no longer pretend that the quest
for disarmament is a sign of weakness—for in a spiraling arms race, a nation’s security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase.19

By 1962, Kennedy had resumed disarmament negotiations with the Soviets, authorizing a three-step disarmament plan that would founder during the 1962-63
Geneva disarmament conference.20 Indeed, there is no
doubt that Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson,
as well as leading members of their administrations
such as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, harbored military and
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moral opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, and
that they feared nuclear war.21 Perceiving that continued increases in nuclear arms would produce little in
the way of security gains, these policymakers took actions to stem the U.S.-Soviet arms race and establish
international nonproliferation controls—efforts that
led to the ratification of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1972 Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT-I) under President Richard
Nixon.22 Article VI of the NPT embodied a commitment by nuclear-weapon states to work toward the
elimination of their arsenals.
Notwithstanding policymakers’ personal sentiments and incremental progress toward establishing
greater nuclear controls, however, the prospects for
disarmament became more remote during the 1960s
and 1970s. First, Article VI of the NPT contained no
metrics or timetable for disarmament. Second, Kennedy’s 1962 disarmament proposal focused far more
on near-term arms limitations than on eventual disarmament, and SALT-I similarly focused on stabilizing
the East-West arms competition instead of eliminating
the weapons. These facts demonstrated that the logic
of arms control and nonproliferation, not of disarmament, had come to dominate the nuclear narrative
among the superpowers. Third, perceptions of the
structural situation prompted policymakers to build
their arsenals to absurdly high numbers. Only one
year before conclusion of the NPT, for example, the
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile had reached its peak
of 32,000 warheads.23 Any expressions of support for
disarmament by U.S. policymakers during these years
must be viewed in the context of these stunning increases, in both the quantity and quality of America’s
arsenal.
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Not even the occasional burst of popular support
for disarmament was enough to force the government’s hand. To be sure, the disarmament movement
enjoyed some successes: It helped push the U.S. Government toward adopting a nuclear test moratorium
in 1958, and toward ratifying the Partial Test Ban
Treaty (PTBT) and the NPT. Indeed, the disarmament
movement arguably helped create the structural conditions for the administrations of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Gerald Ford, and
Jimmy Carter to pursue various arms control initiatives.24 The movement was similarly instrumental in
opposing the B-1 bomber and the so-called neutron
bomb,25 and contacts between disarmament advocates
and presidential candidate Jimmy Carter clearly influenced Carter’s policy positions before he assumed
office.26 Evidence of this can be found in an October
1976 article of Carter’s in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, in which he explicitly links the legitimacy of
nonproliferation efforts to progress toward disarmament. Carter wrote:
I believe we have little right to ask others to deny
themselves such weapons for the indefinite future unless we demonstrate meaningful progress toward the
control, then reduction and, ultimately, elimination of
nuclear arsenals.27

But the impact of the popular disarmament movement that had begun in 1945 was often constrained
by popular fear of the Soviets and suspicions that the
disarmament agenda was a communist plot—particularly with respect to its ultimate goal.28 With the 1979
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the end of détente, the
1979 Iranian Revolution, and the taking of American
hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, even the lim8

ited arms control achievements that the movement
had helped bring about became suspect. Such events
reminded Americans of the dangers beyond their
shores and helped usher into office a tough-talking,
anti-SALT President who would at first increase EastWest tensions but ultimately help place disarmament
back on the U.S. agenda as a primary policy goal.
A Reagan-era Rebirth for Disarmament.
It is both ironic and not at all so that by the end of
Ronald Reagan’s tenure, disarmament had regained a
prominence on the U.S. agenda not seen since the failure of the Baruch Plan. The irony of the matter rests in
the fact that when Reagan assumed office, his administration dragged the previous 2 decades of nuclear
weapons policy decidedly rightward. Rather than attempting to rekindle an arms control process left teetering after the failure of SALT-II, Reagan up-ended
the principle of strategic parity enshrined in the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and SALT-I by launching his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). He placed
a particular focus on strategic modernization efforts,
including pursuit of the MX Peacekeeper and Trident
missiles, the B-1 strategic bomber, and cruise missile
programs. The Reagan administration also changed
the doctrinal thrust of nuclear weapons, planning to
include not only deterrence but the fighting of both
limited and prolonged nuclear wars. In fact, both he
and his subordinates insisted in 1981 that any efforts
to pursue arms control would have to wait until new
weapons programs had progressed enough to give
the United States leverage in negotiations.29
The return of disarmament during Reagan’s tenure
was also ironic because in moving away from arms con-
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trol and deterrence, he unwittingly tapped into public
fears about nuclear war that led to a shift in the political opportunity structure. This shift, in turn, ended up
placing pressure on the Reagan administration to seek
far-reaching accord with the Soviets on nuclear matters. The tenor and substance of his administration’s
early nuclear policies, for example, provoked considerable public unease and led to a previously unseen
outpouring of support for anti-nuclear protests in the
United States and Europe. With millions of people
demonstrating in European capitals against proposed
NATO nuclear deployments, the “nuclear freeze”
movement gained momentum in the United States.30
Popular culture became increasingly sympathetic to
abolitionist sentiment through such publications as
Jonathan Schell’s The Fate of the Earth and the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops’ October 1982 moral
critique of deterrence policy.31 Elite doubts about the
efficacy of deterrence and utility of nuclear weapons
also began to emerge with greater force.32 Such developments produced reluctance in Congress, even
among some Republicans, to fund Reagan’s defense
programs, unless progress was made on the arms control front. By late 1982, public and congressional pressure led Reagan to initiate Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks (the practical successor to SALT-II) and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) discussions.33 These
initiatives were much farther reaching than the SALT
agreements because their goal was, for the first time,
a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the superpower rivals.
Yet, the return of disarmament during Reagan’s
tenure is not entirely ironic. President Reagan long
held anti-nuclear sentiments, after all, beliefs that
were rooted in his liberal past and religious convic-
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tions.34 Thus, despite offering justifications of his administration’s early hawkish policies, as early as 1982
one also finds Reagan suggesting in a radio address
that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be
fought.”35 He would repeat and expand upon this sentiment in a direct appeal to the Soviet people during
his 1984 State of the Union address. Directly suggesting his desire for abolition, Reagan said:
People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane
policy, for your country and for mine, to preserve our
civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value
in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to
make sure they will never be used. But then would it
not be better to do away with them entirely?36

By the October 1986 U.S.-Soviet Reykjavik summit,
Soviet Premier Gorbachev had also expressed support
for eliminating all nuclear weapons, publicly presenting an ambitious plan to achieve this goal in 15 years.
Gorbachev’s heartfelt support of abolition, which he
pursued at the summit, struck a chord with Reagan,
lowering some of the trust-related structural barriers
to cooperation, and resulting in perhaps the first serious discussion of the subject since the failure of the
Baruch Plan.37 Both leaders attempted to capitalize on
the moment. Indeed, were it not for disagreements
over the implications of the ABM Treaty for SDI, Reagan and Gorbachev might have reached an agreement
to mutually disarm, an outcome that just days before
the summit had been all but unthinkable among U.S.
policymakers.38 Although a formal agreement eluded the leaders at Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev
reached an oral agreement that their two countries
should eliminate all nuclear weapons, with Reagan
11

saying that “It would be fine with me if we eliminated
all nuclear weapons,” and Gorbachev replying that
“We can do that.”39
SHAPING A NEW WORLD ORDER, OR SHAPED
BY IT? FROM REYKJAVIK TO ROGUE STATES
Looking back on Reykjavik, two things become
clear. First, President Reagan spontaneously presided
over and almost secured an agreement on nuclear
disarmament. This highlights the tremendous importance of elite agency in what tends to be the highly bureaucratic realm of nuclear weapons policy.40 Second,
with public support for disarmament at an all-time
high, with a mobilized public, with elites increasingly
questioning the practical utility of nuclear weapons
and the efficacy of deterrence strategy, and with U.S.Soviet relations thawing, the structural situation was
changing favorably for disarmament. Many of the obstacles that had prevented serious movement in that
realm seemed to be fading away. The new phase of
arms control marked by deep reductions (e.g., the INF
and Strategic Arms Reduction [START] Treaty41), effectively “broke the back of the nuclear arms race.”42
One might even say that “the nuclear Cold War effectively ended in October 1986.”43 The goal of abolition
appeared to be within reach.
New Risks and Uncertain Priorities in the
Post-Cold War World (1991-2001).
For a brief period of time, it appeared that U.S.
and Soviet leaders were reaching for this goal. Dramatic arms reductions captured headlines. The two
superpowers’ intermediate-range nuclear forces were
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completely eliminated through the 1987 INF treaty.
The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992,
reciprocal but unilateral arms reductions, resulted in
the withdrawal from service by the United States and
the Soviet Union/Russia of as many as 17,000 tactical
nuclear weapons. Ratified in 1991, the START-I treaty
prompted not only further reductions, but increased
transparency. Gone were the days when a paranoid
Soviet state refused to accept verification, a point that
had decades before dealt a mortal blow to disarmament.
Perhaps most consequentially, the Soviet Union
had crumbled, dividing into 15 sovereign states. The
Warsaw Pact’s demise soon followed, and a lonely
Russia entered a prolonged phase of economic decline and social instability. Further, by the end of the
George H. W. Bush administration, a revolution in
military affairs—specifically, the development of advanced conventional capabilities—had provided the
United States with an overwhelming conventional
military advantage against all potential adversaries.44
Such developments left the United States in an unparalleled position of global dominance, one in which it
could begin to shape a “new world order.”45
Part of this new world order could have included
a movement toward nuclear disarmament. Many of
the cards seemed to be in place—decades of presidential support, continued commitment to Article VI,
increasing fears of proliferation, the collapse of the
Soviet threat and a relatively weak Russia, and an invigorated anti-nuclear movement. But the other shoe
never dropped. Why, with the end of the Cold War,
did disarmament largely fall off the political radar?
Why did the Soviet collapse on the heels of Reykjavik
fail to bring abolition to its logical conclusion?
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One might offer numerous explanations for why
disarmament stalled in the early 1990s, but at least five
factors stand out. First, as the Soviet Union crumbled,
U.S. policymakers turned to a variety of other matters—including the 1991 Gulf War, the Madrid peace
conference, the reunification of Germany and, eventually, the expansion of NATO. Second, in the absence
of an arms race, the popular movement that had swept
the world during the 1980s largely lost its urgency.
Third, fears of nuclear war with the Soviet Union
transformed over time into fears of “loose nukes” and
horizontal proliferation, all of which centered on the
concern that “rogue” states or terrorist organizations
would acquire nuclear weapons. This led to a gradual
shift in U.S. policy focus away from arms reductions
and disarmament, a shift that was perhaps best embodied by the elimination of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) as an independent entity in April 1999, when the nearly 40-year old ACDA
was fully merged into the U.S. Department of State.46
Though U.S. officials continued to speak periodically
about disarmament as a long-term goal, there were no
well-structured or concerted efforts by them in the decade after the Cold War to achieve this goal. Indeed,
by late 2005, another round of government reorganization had not only merged the State Department’s
Bureau of Arms Control with its Nonproliferation
Bureau, but it had even resulted in the removal of the
words “arms control” from the name of the Department’s newly created Bureau of International Security
and Nonproliferation.
Fourth, initial attempts to adapt the U.S. nuclear
posture to meet new threats encountered heavy bureaucratic resistance, which ultimately resulted in a
perpetuation of the status quo.47 Finally, U.S. policy-
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makers grew increasingly divided over how the sole
remaining superpower should define and address the
new international strategic context, as well as the role
that America’s nuclear weapons should play in this
context. Were nuclear weapons still relevant for deterring past or emerging adversaries? Were they still relevant to extended deterrence commitments? Were they
useful for dissuading states or terrorists from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction (WMD)?48
With the new millennium approaching, President Bill
Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, poignantly observed that “the administration and Congress have not yet agreed on a common post-Cold
War strategy for responding to [the development and
proliferation of advanced nuclear weapons].”49
Thus, as Janne Nolan has argued, “. . . it is now
a cliché in Washington that the end of the ideological struggle with the Soviet Union was not necessarily
good news.”50 The predictable days (or at least they
seemed so in retrospect) of the bipolar rivalry had
ended. In their place had arrived strategic uncertainty.
While arms control would enjoy some success during
the Bush and Clinton administrations (e.g., START-I,
the Lisbon Protocol, the Open Skies Treaty, the Agreed
Framework, and START-II), and while the NPT was
indefinitely extended in 1995, the United States would
neither reach nor ratify many agreements after the
early 1990s. Instead, in the absence of strong public
interest in arms control or disarmament, uncertainty
of how to adapt to the post-Cold War world, and with
congressional and bureaucratic resistance to arms
control initiatives and growing suspicion of Russia,
initiatives such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT),
and a third round of START floundered.51 A nuclear
posture review launched by President Clinton in 1993
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and completed in 1994 seemed to reflect this trend.
Rather than reducing America’s reliance on nuclear
weapons,
The decisions that emerged from the 1993-94 Nuclear
Posture Review. . . reinforced the operational and political importance of nuclear weapons. Taken together,
these decisions ratified a triad of nuclear forces, with
diminished but still large numbers of strategic forces;
renewed the U.S. commitment to initiate the use of
nuclear weapons against existing and potential new
adversaries; and granted political approval for targeting plans to develop nuclear options against regional
and nonnuclear contingencies.52

A 1997 Presidential Decision Directive providing
guidance for nuclear weapons employment (PSS/NSC
60), the first such directive in over 15 years, similarly
called for retaining a wide range of survivable nuclear options—from the ability to inflict overwhelming
damage against enemy assets to more graduated options.53
Although U.S. policy failed to come into greater
fundamental accord with broad disarmament goals,
some American elites expressed a contrary view. Seeing the evolving situation differently, they believed
that the Soviet collapse made abolition more, not less,
important. A panel of experts brought together by
the Stimson Center in Washington, DC, for example,
argued in a 1995 report that the growing proliferation threat necessitated abolition on national security
grounds. The recommendations of this panel, however, largely fell on deaf ears—even though its members included General Andrew Goodpaster and Paul
Nitze, neither of whom could be considered shrinking
national security violets.54 A similar fate would befall
a paper authored by the well-respected chairman of
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the House Armed Services Committee, Les Aspin, as
well as a formal statement in favor of abolition by 58
generals and admirals, including 16 from the United
States.55
To be sure, the United States had not suddenly
lost its formal or rhetorical commitment to the goal of
disarmament. The NPT’s Article VI commitment was
still in place, after all, and President Clinton from time
to time highlighted it as the overarching U.S. goal. In
March 2000, Clinton argued that:
Remarkable progress in nuclear disarmament has occurred since the end of the Cold War. . . . The United
States is committed to the ultimate elimination of all
nuclear weapons. Achieving this goal will be neither
easy nor rapid. Accordingly, the United States rededicates itself to work tirelessly and expeditiously to
create conditions that will make possible even deeper
reductions in nuclear weapons, and ultimately their
elimination.56

But Clinton’s assertion that the CTBT and other
initiatives were steps toward disarmament is colored
both by the lack of his articulation of a far-reaching
disarmament strategy and the reality of a Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) and a Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) that maintained the centrality of
nuclear weapons in U.S. security planning. Clinton’s
“lead and hedge” strategy against the possibility of
a resurgent Russia or threats elsewhere, and his continuation of the Bush administration’s policy of “calculated ambiguity,” were practical manifestations of
this continued centrality for nuclear weapons in U.S.
policy.57 Secretary of Defense William Cohen went so
far as to suggest, in an interview with the Washington
Post, that those who believed the end of the Cold War
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opened the door for a swift move toward U.S. nuclear
abolition had no home in the Clinton administration.58
Disarmament Continues its Retreat (2001-09).
That the Clinton administration was not prepared
to rush toward disarmament did not make it exceptional in the annals of American history. But this is
exactly the point. While many U.S. administrations
have expressed a desire for abolishing nuclear weapons, none has been willing to race toward the goal
(not even when the structural conditions seemed most
permissive), and almost none have articulated a clear
view of and demonstrated a sustained commitment
to disarmament—the George W. Bush administration
perhaps least of all. Staffed by critics of traditional
arms control approaches and abolition opponents,
the Bush administration took a highly skeptical view
toward international treaties and institutions generally.59 The ascendant view in the halls of Washington,
DC, in January 2001 was that treaties were not worth
the paper they were written on, since states willing
to sign treaties were often willing to take the actions
required by them even in their absence. Further, this
viewpoint held that American power could and should
be used to further its foreign policy objectives. Those
who would follow along were welcome; those who
would not were “against us” and should be shunted
aside.60 These natural inclinations were exponentially
magnified in the aftermath of the attacks of September
11, 2001 (9/11), which led administration officials to
treat terrorism as the primary U.S. national security
threat. Indeed, to the extent that the Bush administration focused on nuclear issues after 9/11, its efforts
were primarily directed toward lowering the proba-
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bility that a terrorist organization or a state sponsor of
terrorism would acquire nuclear weapons, rather than
toward concluding arms control agreements. None of
this augured well for abolition.
These attitudes and events resulted in some significant departures from previous administrations’
nuclear policies. One obvious departure was the Bush
administration’s disdain for old-style arms control
treaties, with their intrusive and extensive verification
provisions and strict limits on U.S. flexibility. Along
these lines, the administration decided in 2001 to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to free itself from
the legal shackles impeding development of a national
missile defense (NMD) system—a reversal of 30 years
of nuclear policy that contributed to significant deteriorations in U.S.-Russian relations.61 The CTBT, widely
thought to be a cornerstone of disarmament efforts,
was left in legislative limbo—opposed both for its formality and lingering concerns about verifiability. In
place of such agreements, a concerted effort was made
to shift course in favor of less onerous treaties and informal agreements. Thus, while the Bush administration did conclude one significant arms reduction treaty with Russia in terms of numerical reductions—the
2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)—
the agreement contained no verification provisions
of its own.62 The 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI), although an important initiative in its own right,
was not a treaty at all, but an informal agreement by
interested parties to stem the illegal flow of materials
that could be utilized in WMD programs.63
Supporters of Bush-era policy might counter that
the SORT Treaty led to large reductions in strategic
forces, and that the Bush administration actually reduced the U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons through
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its enumeration of the so-called “new triad” in the
2001 NPR and 2006 National Security Strategy, which
integrated nuclear and advanced conventional forces
for the purposes of deterrence.64 These points could
be used to suggest that, in effect, the Bush administration continued the move toward deep reductions, and
that the unfavorable optics of the situation were due
to partisan political posturing.65 There is a measure of
truth to such statements. There was little new, after
all, about President Bush’s emphasis on the centrality
of nuclear weapons for hedging against current and
future threats.66 Moreover, the move toward greater
integration of advanced conventional capabilities in
the U.S. deterrent did represent a diversification of
U.S. deterrence policy.67 But one should not take this
line of argument too far.
Creating an expanded role for the U.S. conventional arsenal and reducing the overkill capability of
U.S. nuclear forces is not akin to advocating abolition,
even though some Bush administration officials occasionally alluded to it as such.68 Such actions notwithstanding, therefore, the Bush administration evinced
a clear move away from established disarmament
goals. This is particularly evident when one reviews
developments at the 2005 NPT Review Conference,
where the United States not only distanced itself from
the 1995 and 2000 Conference decisions on disarmament (e.g., the “thirteen steps”) but intervened to have
removed from a UN summit document references to
nonproliferation and disarmament.69 The move away
from abolition is also evident in the Bush administration’s rejection of verification provisions in arms control treaties. It is widely accepted, after all, that intrusive verification and tough enforcement are necessary
components of any move toward zero.70 Simply put:
no verification, no disarmament.
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The Bush administration even endeavored to rewrite nonproliferation rules by dividing proliferators
into two groups—those who could be trusted with
their nuclear weapons (India) and those who must
be isolated or attacked for their real or suspected actions (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea). Although the
United States and India jointly pledged in June 2005
to support nonproliferation, for example, the nuclear
deal with India advanced by the Bush administration
contained no provisions to constrain India’s military
nuclear program.71 While it is eminently reasonable to
suggest that a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein would
have posed a far greater threat than does a nucleararmed India, the relevant point here is that the Bush
administration seemed to consider disarmament a
priority only insofar as it pertained to “rogue” states
and the possibility of terrorist acquisition of nuclear
weapons.72 If there was a general lack of concern vis-àvis Indian nuclear weapons, one might ask, could U.S.
disarmament have been a priority?
A NEW CENTER OR A RETURN TO
NORMALCY? THE FOUR HORSEMEN RIDE
TO TOWN
Thus, with the Bush administration entering its
final years, disarmament seemed further away than
ever. Moreover, by 2007, the post-Cold War world had
undergone some dramatic shifts that made structural
conditions decidedly less favorable for abolition, even
as they made abolition itself more urgent. North Korea had built and tested its own nuclear weapons. Iran
continued to defy International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations (UN) Security Council
demands, and was increasingly suspected of pursuing
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a weapons program. The United States had further reified the role of nuclear weapons in its national security
strategy and had pushed ahead with missile defense
plans to counter Iran and North Korea, providing an
incentive for Russia—which was already relying more
heavily on nuclear weapons for certain missions—to
further increase this reliance.73 At the same time, the
START-I agreement was nearing expiration, with no
successor in sight, and the NPT seemed to be crumbling under the weight of violations by Iran and North
Korea and circumventions with respect to India. Finally, with the United States strategically hobbled by
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and with its influence
declining globally, American leaders no longer appeared to be in a position to reshape the world dramatically according to their desires, even should they
again decide to pursue disarmament.
It was in this context that former Secretaries of
State George Schultz, William Perry, and Henry Kissinger, along with former Senator Sam Nunn, published their 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed calling for
a world without nuclear weapons.74 Their statements
have not necessarily been unique as an example of bipartisan support for abolition, since such support has
never divided evenly along partisan lines.75 More interesting is that these former Cold Warriors appear to
have had a significant change of heart with respect to
the nuclear question, and that their arguments are, unlike most previous efforts, gaining political traction in
the United States. Not content to write opinion pieces,
the so-called “four horsemen” have been actively engaging in efforts to build institutional and elite-level
support for disarmament. Their boldness has helped
not only to reintroduce abolition into the mainstream
(albeit still as a long-term goal) but to set off a fire-
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storm of debate among American elites about how to
get to “global zero.”
One interesting question that suggests itself here
concerns why the “gang of four’s” efforts have been so
consequential in elevating discussions of abolition in
the United States. This is not the first time that hawkish
foreign policy and security luminaries have endorsed
abolition.76 A possible answer is that by 2007 the perceived urgency of disarmament had again grown, as
nuclear weapons spread to troublesome actors and
fears mounted that they would continue to spread—
perhaps even into the hands of terrorists. Indeed, if
one examines the logic behind the so-called gang of
four’s calls for abolition, a prime motivator seems to
be that new nuclear states and terrorists may not be
deterrable. With the threat of proliferation to such actors ever-present in a nuclear armed world, the four
argue that nuclear weapons have become more of a
liability than an asset for the United States.77 Concerns
over a recalcitrant Russia, the expiration of START-I
verification provisions, and the weakening of the NPT
may have similarly contributed to increasing the saliency of the pro-abolition argument among political
elites. Perhaps the newfound excitement of elites over
abolition also reflects a certain post-reactionary desire
to correct course after the Bush administration’s deviations from long-established norms.
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FORECASTING THE U.S. NUCLEAR FUTURE:
YES WE CAN (EVENTUALLY?)
The Obama Administration: Pledges and Actions.
It is commonly believed that the election of President Barack Obama has come at an opportune time,
given the increasing pro-abolition sentiment of the
past few years. Obama has consistently offered clear
rhetorical support for a nuclear-free world—a deep
conviction that he has held since his undergraduate
days at Columbia University.78 His most complete
articulation of this vision was during an April 2009
speech at Hradcany Square in Prague, where he said
that “today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a
world without nuclear weapons.”79
In addition to this personal commitment, one
might also note that several leading Obama administration officials have publicly endorsed the vision of
a nuclear-free world, including Robert Einhorn, Rose
Gotemoeller, and Ivo Daalder.80 Obama’s combination
of presidential statements and his choice of officials
for top nuclear-related posts are perhaps the clearest
indication that abolition has returned to the American
political mainstream.81 Indeed, the fact that disarmament is again a mainstream concept in the United
States becomes particularly evident when one considers that during the 2008 presidential campaign, both
then-Senator Obama and Senator John McCain—who
agreed on little else—openly supported a prudent,
step-wise movement toward disarmament.82
President Obama’s words have been backed up
with pledges to pursue several initiatives aimed at
bringing disarmament closer to reality. Progress seems

24

to be evident on multiple fronts. In September 2009, the
President chaired a UN Security Council summit that
unanimously approved the vision of a world without
nuclear weapons.83 The United States and Russia recently concluded a START follow-on agreement, New
START, which mandates bilateral warhead and stockpile reductions and renews mechanisms for verification. The 2010 NPR, which was released in April 2010,
reduces somewhat the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.
strategy and foreign policy; indeed, throughout the
deliberations over the NPR, the administration privately insisted on this outcome.84 Also, in April 2010,
the White House hosted a Nuclear Security Summit
that brought together senior officials from 47 nations
and won commitments for enhancing the safety and
security of nuclear material, as well as for preventing
nuclear smuggling and terrorism. Approximately 60
percent of national commitments made at this summit have been completed, and a follow-up summit is
scheduled for 2012 in the Republic of Korea.85
Finally, the Obama administration’s April 2010
conclusion of the New START agreement with Russia provided a strong foundation for reinvigorating
the nonproliferation regime, which had been severely
stressed after a decade of proliferation and political
disagreements. Indeed, although state parties to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) had agreed in
1995 to extend the agreement indefinitely, the coming
decade placed such strain on the nonproliferation regime that by 2005 the NPT Review Conference was
unable to produce a final consensus document, due
to disagreement over how to handle issues such as
Iranian nuclear malfeasance and a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. Non-nuclear weapon states
(NNWS) had also become deeply skeptical that nucle-
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ar weapon states (NWS) were working in good faith to
eliminate their nuclear arsenals, leading them to oppose strengthened nonproliferation activities without
progress toward disarmament.
With the April 2010 signing of New START—the
first new U.S.-Russian arms reduction treaty in nearly
a decade—progress toward disarmament appeared to
be restarted. Partly because of this progress, the 2010
NPT Review Conference was successful in producing
a final document that included, among other things, a
recommitment by NPT parties to the nonproliferation
regime and an action plan on nonproliferation. Some
believe that this positive outcome at the 2010 Review
Conference had the ancillary benefit of strengthening
the Obama administration’s hand in dealing with both
the Iranian and North Korean portfolios.86
Continuity, Not Revolution.
Despite this progress, however, the current prodisarmament zeitgeist is not as revolutionary as it is
sometimes portrayed. To be sure, nuclear disarmament debates in the United States may now be occurring in more detail and in a more sustained way than
at most points in the past. But the step-wise, decadeslong process advanced today by most advocates—one
that begins with formalized arms reductions, a fissile
material production cutoff, a comprehensive test ban,
control over the nuclear fuel cycle, intense verification
and enforcement, and gradual delegitimization of
weapons possession, and that ends with abolition—is
in many respects the very same approach that has been
offered since the dawn of the nuclear age.
Moreover, previous presidents have enjoyed arms
control and nonproliferation successes, and have
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viewed their efforts as paving the way toward abolition. Yet, a variety of factors—from structural barriers to a lack of sustained political will—have impeded
progress toward that goal. Many of these factors continue to obstruct the path toward abolition. Indeed,
few mainstream proponents in the United States speak
of abolition as achievable anytime in the foreseeable
future. “I’m not naïve,” said the President in Prague,
“This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not
in my lifetime.”87 If one makes the reasonable assumption that, by modern standards of life expectancy,
President Obama could live at least another 40 years,
it becomes clear that the timeline envisioned by mainstream abolition supporters may be quite long—50,
60, 70, perhaps even 100 years or more.
Given all that might change in the interim, can
“such grand schemes . . . be carried forward by reasonable people making demonstrable progress at a
steady pace”?88 Perhaps. Abolition is not on its face
unachievable, and the United States is not predestined
to sit atop a nuclear-armed world. Yet, numerous and
significant roadblocks to abolition linger. One might
divide these roadblocks into two broad categories:
conceptual and structural.
Guarding Your Optimism: Conceptual Roadblocks
to Disarmament.
The conceptual roadblock to disarmament might
be best illustrated by paraphrasing the classic film Dr.
Strangelove. Simply put, the United States has learned
to “love the bomb.” Or better, one might describe it as
a love-hate relationship, one in which:
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Nuclear weapons are presented both as terrifying objects that could destroy the nation in half an hour and
as the ultimate guarantors of our security. Nuclear
weapons are terrifying, but deterrence keeps us safe.89

In short, Americans hate the bomb for what it can
do to us and to innocent people worldwide, but we
cherish it as the mainstay of our national security.90
Learning, or perhaps more accurately, realistically
planning and preparing to live without nuclear weapons, will be an important step toward abolition. Yet,
this is a step that U.S. policymakers, including those
in the Obama administration, have yet to take. This
shortfall is reflected in the open-source literature on
the subject, in which abolition proponents explore
every conceivable question related to reaching global
zero but are generally silent on how to achieve what
may be the most difficult task of all—maintaining
strategic stability while moving from low numbers to
zero, as well as after arriving at zero.91 Where these
proponents do address the topic, they tend to suggest
that, ultimately, what will be needed for “global zero”
is a world in which the nature of international political
relations is dramatically changed from what currently
exists.92 Such proposals can at times seem a bit fantastical, even for abolition supporters.
Indeed, the words and actions of the Obama administration suggest that nuclear deterrence will remain a
cornerstone of U.S. national security for the foreseeable future, just as it has been for decades. Despite
partisan attacks to the contrary, Obama is not a Pollyanna President.93 He has stated unequivocally and
in multiple venues, for example, that “As long as these
weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe,
secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary,

28

and guarantee that defense to our allies.”94 Vice President Joe Biden has similarly argued that this commitment will extend, “for as long as nuclear weapons are
required to defend our country and our allies.”95 Their
words have been backed up by actions; most recently,
the administration has sought large funding increases
for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex—a move that
enjoyed bipartisan support from leading national security experts, including the so-called “gang of four”
and the members of the Strategic Posture Commission,
a bipartisan panel headed by former Defense Secretaries James Schlesinger and William Perry.96
Other administration officials have similarly emphasized the continuing importance of America’s nuclear deterrent. In July 2009, Undersecretary of State
for Arms Control Ellen Tauscher argued that while we
need an “updated nuclear posture” that “more accurately reflect[s] the threat environment. . . . We must
do this while continuing to deter any nuclear armed
adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies.”97
It should be noted that Undersecretary Tauscher’s
comments were offered at a symposium on deterrence
at the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska.
Also revealing is the language of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a document that simultaneously asserts that “new, tailored regional deterrence
architectures” will permit “a reduced role for nuclear
weapons in our national security strategy,” and insists
that:
Until such time as the Administration’s goal of a world
free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a core mission of the Department of Defense. We will maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the United
States, and on our allies and partners.98
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Even the strongest mainstream advocates of deep
reductions and abolition seem to accept that the United States will need to maintain its nuclear deterrent
for some time to come. Writers Hans M. Kristensen,
Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich posit that:
While the ultimate goal is nuclear abolition, a minimal deterrence doctrine creates a stable resting spot
that minimizes the salience and danger of remaining
nuclear weapons and allows all the world’s nuclear
powers to come into a stable equilibrium before moving to the last step of denuclearization.99

In short, mainstream abolition supporters may not
be conceptually prepared for a nuclear-free world,
even if it is technically possible to reach zero. Serious planning for maintaining security in a world with
small numbers, and for doing so in a world with no
nuclear weapons, must occur before the United States
moves in that direction.100 The ascendance of such discussions in the public sphere will be a better indication
that the United States and the world are advancing
significantly toward nuclear disarmament than talk
of a second New START agreement, tactical weapon
reductions, or movement toward ratifying the FMCT
and CTBT.
Guarding Your Optimism: Structural Roadblocks to
Disarmament.
While conceptual roadblocks provide partial insight into the U.S. nuclear future, structural roadblocks are at least as important to consider in this
respect. During the Cold War, numerous structural
barriers blocked the path toward disarmament. Even
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when the key structural barrier of East-West competition disintegrated with the end of the Cold War and
the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, others
took its place. What one finds today is a complex web
of structural barriers to abolition, some of which have
long pedigrees, some of which are relatively new.
While structural permissiveness does not guarantee
policy outcomes, these barriers will also need to be
addressed if serious U.S. movement toward abolition
is to be realized.
One such barrier is a byproduct of the material and
human support afforded to the American nuclear infrastructure. Nuclear weapons-related programs continue to receive appropriations that dwarf a variety
of other federal programs. In 2008, the United States
spent more than $52.4 billion on nuclear weapons
programs; Stephen I. Schwartz and Deepti Choubey
write:
By way of comparison, the 2008 nuclear weapons and
weapons-related “budget” exceed[ed] all anticipated
government expenditures on international diplomacy
and foreign assistance ($39.5 billion) and natural resources and the environment ($33 billion). It is nearly
double the budget for general science, space, and technology ($27.4 billion), and it is almost 14 times what
the U.S. Department of Energy has allocated for all
energy-related research and development.101

Reinforcing this commitment, the Obama administration has consistently supported increased funding for the U.S. nuclear complex and deterrent.102 This
budgetary support has been complemented by efforts
to incentivize job assignments related to the nuclear
deterrent, particularly in the wake of concerns that the
nuclear weapons infrastructure is decaying, and of security fears emanating from high-profile mishaps of
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the past few years, including the unauthorized flight
in 2007 of six nuclear-armed cruise missiles from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air
Force Base in Louisiana.103
Such efforts are largely aimed at ensuring the credibility and security of America’s nuclear arsenal, an entirely reasonable objective so long as the United States
possesses and relies on nuclear weapons. Yet, they
may also have negative consequences with respect to
abolition, including leading to a further entrenchment
of the nuclear mission in U.S. security policy. The bureaucracies supported and reified by today’s decisions
are likely to prove resilient in the future as attempts
are made to advance broad changes in nuclear policy
such as abolition.104 The case of the 1994 NPR is a good
example of how bureaucracies are adept at resisting
change.105 Unsurprisingly, the Obama administration
encountered significant bureaucratic resistance by “elements within the Department of Defense (DoD) and
other agencies,” during the writing of the 2010 NPR.106
A second structural barrier is the lack of public
mobilization in favor of abolition. Unlike in previous decades, the most recent push for abolition is an
elite-level phenomenon.107 Gone are the days where
millions marched in European capitals, and a “ban
the bomb” movement swept the United States. The
outrage, fear, and sense of urgency that drove public involvement in the nuclear issue—from the 1950s
to the early 1990s—largely faded with the Cold War.
Polling over the past 6 years underlines this shift. In
2007, only 38 percent of Americans (and 31 percent of
Russians) agreed when asked if “our goal should be
to gradually eliminate all nuclear weapons through
an international agreement, while developing effective systems for verifying all countries are eliminating
theirs too.”108
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While this polling was conducted before the latest
push for abolition reached full stride, its results are
still noteworthy. Since the question asked hews closely
to abolition proponents’ current proposals, including
those of the Obama administration, the results demonstrate, at a minimum, the lack of public accord on
what our nuclear future should be. Consider also that
when asked the same question in 2004, 55 percent of
Americans responded affirmatively that disarmament
should be the end goal. This precipitous decline, coupled with minimal public interest in ratification of the
New START Treaty in 2010, suggests that American
political leaders are not likely to face much domestic
pressure to act on disarmament over the coming years.
The absence of such pressure is important, because
research demonstrates that popular mobilization has
been an important facilitator of substantive agreements on nuclear weapons use and possession—one
that influences politicians through direct pressure by
changing the political opportunity structure in which
they operate.109
Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance of
domestic politics as a structural roadblock to disarmament, as was evidenced by the bitter debates over ratification of New START. Much to the surprise of the
Obama administration and expert analysts, Senator
Jon Kyl (R-AZ), the Republican point man on nuclear
arms issues, led a protracted effort in opposition to
the Treaty, despite having been granted many concessions by the administration. Moreover, whatever the
ultimate reason for Senator Kyl’s opposition—whether political or technical—legislative efforts continue in
Congress to place limitations on New START implementation and delay reductions, efforts that could undermine the Treaty if enacted into law.110 To be sure,
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the New START debates placed arms control back on
the national stage and to an extent may have educated
a new generation of congressional staff about these issues, but the lingering efforts in opposition to New
START suggest that any follow-on arms control initiatives, let alone initiatives that would substantially advance the goal of disarmament, are likely to face stiff
resistance on Capitol Hill.
Another structural barrier to Washington’s decision to disarm is related to the conditions set by American policymakers for moving forward with abolition.
Like others before him, President Obama clearly states
that the United States will retain its deterrent “so long
as there is a country with nuclear weapons.”111 The
2010 QDR insists that the DoD nuclear mission will be
sustained “[u]ntil such time as the Administration’s
goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved.”112
The “gang of four” argues that “as we work to . . .
realize the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, we recognize the necessity to maintain the safety,
security, and reliability of our own weapons.”113 One
cannot help but think that this “you first” approach is
strikingly similar to the Baruch plan’s insistence that
the United States will disarm only once others have
done so. Yet, a U.S. nuclear monopoly is not likely to
be any more acceptable to other states in the future
than it was to the Soviets in the late 1940s.
These issues point to a fourth structural roadblock.
Put in the interrogative: If U.S. disarmament depends
on the disarmament of others, will those others disarm? Despite the increased talk about abolition over
the past several years in Western capitals, global trend
lines do not match the rhetoric. Russia is arguably increasing, not decreasing, its reliance on nuclear weapons; some observers believe that Moscow is in the pro-

34

cess of increasing its nuclear arsenal. While Russian
representatives deny this accusation, it nonetheless
proved a major stumbling block at last year’s Global
Zero talks in Paris.114 In the Middle East, Iran’s blatant
defiance of UN Security Council and IAEA demands
underscores suspicions that it is pursuing a military
nuclear capability. Faced with a potential nucleararmed Iran and surrounded by largely hostile states,
Israel is unlikely to disarm. More than 10 other Middle
Eastern states are currently pursuing nuclear energy
agreements with suppliers, cooperation that may be
driven in part by fears of Iran and that could lead to
future proliferation.115
A similar situation obtains elsewhere. Indo-Pakistani relations have improved somewhat over the
past several years, but the two states remain adversaries and show no signs of reaching a groundbreaking
nuclear or political accord. Reportedly, Pakistan has
nearly doubled its nuclear arsenal over the past few
years and continues to increase its production of fissile material. As a result, Islamabad may soon become
the world’s fifth largest nuclear power, ahead of Great
Britain.116 In East Asia, North Korea has already tested
two weapons and, while it seems to be holding off on a
third test, six-party efforts to promote a denuclearized
Korean peninsula remain deadlocked. Even France,
which is situated in peaceful and prosperous Western
Europe, remains skeptical about disarmament. At the
2010 Paris disarmament talks, French Foreign Ministry Secretary General Pierre Sellal coyly offered that
“France’s nuclear deterrent has protected our country
very well for many years.”117
What events would be required to bring these
states closer to disarmament? The potential list is long
and notoriously difficult to achieve, including a halt
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to NATO expansion and U.S. involvement in Russia’s
“near-abroad,” Arab-Israeli peace, and resolution of
the Kashmir conflict. With respect to North Korea and
Iran, the question is at least as complex, and would
involve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and
bringing Iran into full compliance with IAEA and UN
Security Council demands. Aside from the resolution
of all of these conflicts, successful abolition might also
require the establishment of an international norm
against nuclear possession to undermine the legitimacy of those who may in the future seek to acquire
or retain nuclear arsenals. The key point here is simply that a structural context favorable to disarmament
looks little like the world in which we live today.
When discussing structural roadblocks to disarmament, one must also consider the role of the so-called
power paradox. This concept describes a situation in
which a huge conventional military advantage makes
nuclear disarmament possible and perhaps even preferable for the United States, however, that same conventional advantage may simultaneously make other
states less likely to disarm.118 When weaker states look
through the lens of the power paradox, they may see
U.S. advocacy for disarmament as a cynical “ploy”
aimed at consolidating American power rather than
as a means toward establishing a safer world.119 A
forceful push for disarmament, in the context of overweening U.S. conventional dominance, could thus
bring about an equally strong anti-disarmament reaction from states seeking to hedge against U.S. power.
Even if agreement is reached among states to move
in tandem toward zero, there remains the challenge
of establishing effective verification and enforcement
of disarmament. Many states may be unwilling to accept intrusive verification inspections or, after accept-
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ing them, seek to circumvent them or renege on their
commitments. North Korea’s withdrawal from the
NPT and the international community’s impotence in
dealing with it are particularly illustrative here, but so
is the case of the United States under the Bush administration, since it not only withdrew from the ABM
Treaty but willingly let agreements with important
verification provisions expire. Provided that verification concerns are overcome, the challenge of enforcement will remain. To make restrictions effective, it
must be possible to punish violators, but setting up an
effective mechanism for doing so remains a difficult
endeavor. One analyst has insisted that enforcement
is “perhaps the greatest challenge in nuclear disarmament,” noting that the difficulties associated with enforcement are highlighted by the cases of Iraq, North
Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria.120
Verification and enforcement are important not
only with respect to the elimination of nuclear arsenals
but to the spread of sensitive nuclear materials and
technologies that can facilitate proliferation. International agreement on strong measures to secure the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear materials generally would
help to create a solid basis on which the United States
and others could move toward disarmament. Yet, the
challenges here are long-standing and substantial. The
FMCT remains trapped in the UN Conference on Disarmament, even though there are efforts underway to
find alternative venues for its consideration. The CTBT
is unlikely to be ratified by all the states necessary for
it to come into force at any point in the foreseeable future. Securing nuclear materials and preventing proliferation will likely also require internationalization
of the nuclear fuel cycle, making the Additional Protocol (AP) a condition of nuclear supply, and banning
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the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR)
technologies to any state that does not already possess
them. Notwithstanding some progress on multilateral
fuel cycle facilities, nuclear suppliers remain divided
over whether to require the AP as a precondition for
all types of nuclear assistance. Proposals to ban ENR
transfers are even more divisive, with few besides the
United States supporting them, and with Washington
itself divided over the idea.
One must also consider the impact of future cases
of proliferation on U.S. behavior, as well as the impact
of these actions on the prospects for disarmament.
The case of Iraq in 2003 is instructive here. While a
majority of Americans were supportive of moves toward general nuclear disarmament during the initial
period in which charges of WMD possession were
leveled against Saddam Hussein, they seemed also to
have been inclined to respond to this perceived threat
through the use of military force, particularly in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks and the history of conflict
with Hussein’s Iraq. Leaving aside the debate about
the Bush administration’s motivations for going to
war in Iraq in 2003, the relevant point here is that aggressive responses to proliferation may heighten the
salience of the power paradox—both in the target
state and among observers—by highlighting the extent of U.S. conventional military superiority and the
security fears of weaker U.S. adversaries. By extension, these responses also may make achieving disarmament more difficult. Consider, for example, that in
December 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi announced his decision to relinquish all elements of Libya’s WMD program. In spring 2011, the United States
and NATO launched military action against Gaddafi’s
forces in Libya under the banner of protecting civil-
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ian life. Future proliferators are likely to give careful
consideration to the question of whether, if Gaddafi
had retained his WMD program, NATO might have
refrained from taking these actions. At the same time,
there may also be risks to inaction in the face of weapons proliferation since, if proliferation is tacitly accepted, it may gradually weaken the nonproliferation
regime and undermine one of the key institutional
requirements for successful abolition.
A final structural roadblock to U.S. disarmament
that must be considered is Washington’s continued
reliance on nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of its
national defense, including its extended deterrent
commitments to allies. This is more than a conceptual
problem, because so long as nuclear weapons provide
the central backstop for direct and extended deterrence, it will be practically impossible to eliminate
them. Barring a dramatic reduction in the need for
deterrence strategies, therefore, a prerequisite to U.S.
disarmament will be the deployment of conventional
alternatives that assuage fears about nuclear drawdowns held by U.S. policymakers and their allies,
without antagonizing potential peer competitors such
as Russia and China or exacerbating the power paradox.121 The activation of the U.S. Global Strike Command in August 2009 represents some progress in the
integration of advanced conventional capabilities in
America’s deterrent posture. Conventional Prompt
Global Strike (PGS) may eventually help pave the way
for a deep reduction in America’s reliance on nuclear
weapons; indeed, as other states reduce their nuclear
arsenals, the efficacy of conventional capabilities for
deterrence is likely to grow. But this efficacy will depend on foreign space- and cyber-warfare capabilities,
since the effectiveness of PGS depends in large part on
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the security of computer networks and the availability
of satellite guidance, and it is precisely those capabilities that are emerging as the major new threats to U.S.
national security.
CONCLUSION
One might draw two tentative conclusions about
America’s nuclear future based on the present study.
First, the Obama administration’s advocacy of nuclear
abolition and its efforts to move down this path are significant, but President Obama’s support for disarmament is hardly a radical break from the past. Indeed,
Obama’s approach to the issue is overwhelmingly
cautious in nature, reflecting as it does a widely shared
view among American policymakers that, although
disarmament is in the long-term American interest, it
must not be pursued at the expense of near-term national security requirements. Moreover, substantial
roadblocks remain on the path toward abolition. Some
of these roadblocks will be particularly daunting to
overcome and may require a dramatic evolution in the
conduct and nature of international political relations.
Thus, it is highly unlikely that Washington will make
any bold moves toward global zero in the foreseeable
future. A more probable outcome is that the Obama
administration will continue to move in step-wise motion toward the long-term goal of abolition, a goal that
the President acknowledges will not be achieved in
our lifetimes.
The second broad conclusion one can draw is that
history is an unpredictable handmaiden of events.
Throughout the U.S. nuclear past, support for abolition as well as the barriers to it have ebbed, flowed,
and transformed. Ironically, when the barriers to
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disarmament seemed lowest, political and popular
enthusiasm for this goal largely dissipated. It may
therefore be the case that when disarmament is most
needed, it is least possible, and when it is most possible, it is least desired. Whether this trend will hold in
the future, and what can be done to militate against it,
remain open questions. If future administrations are
less committed to nuclear disarmament, if elite and
public support for abolition fails to coalesce, and if the
strategic context shifts in unexpected ways, the current push for disarmament could be derailed.
What does the future hold for the abolitionist
agenda? From American shores, the mission has regained prominence. But the answer is as unclear as it
ever was.
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